October Term 2025
No. 24-813

Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana

Petitioner Chevron USA Incorporated · Respondent Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana

Reporter
608 U.S. ___ (2026)
From
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
How it got here
writ of <i>certiorari</i>

Can an oil company being sued in state court for its World War II-era oil production move its case to federal court simply because the oil was produced to meet federal government contracts for wartime fuel—even if the contract did not specifically direct how to produce the oil?

Question before the Court

What happened

Beginning in 2013, several Louisiana coastal parishes—including Plaquemines Parish and Cameron Parish—filed lawsuits in state court against a consortium of oil and gas companies such as BP America Production Company, Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Shell Oil Company, and others. The parishes, joined by Louisiana state agencies and officials, alleged the companies had violated Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978 (SLCRMA), which requires certain activities within the state’s designated “coastal zone” to comply with an environmental permitting system. Specifically, the parishes claimed the companies engaged in oil and gas exploration, production, and transportation in various “Operational Areas” along the Louisiana coast without securing the proper permits or by violating the conditions of the permits they did have. The complaints further alleged that pre-1980 activities (before SLCRMA’s effective date) were not “lawfully commenced,” and thus not exempt under the Act’s grandfather clause. The parishes seek wide-ranging remedies, including damages and restoration of affected coastal lands. The events at issue span decades, with the oil companies’ challenged operations beginning prior to SLCRMA and, in some cases, dating back to World War II. During the war, some defendant companies operated under federal government contracts to refine petroleum products for the war effort, and they argue that some of the crude oil produced in the disputed areas was used to fulfill those contracts. The parishes' claims, however, focus on whether the companies’ activities in the coastal zone were environmentally compliant under Louisiana law, regardless of any federal wartime contracts or regulations. After the initial filing in state court, the oil companies have tried multiple times to remove these cases to federal court, invoking various theories of federal jurisdiction, including the federal officer removal statute, based on their World War II-era federal contracts. Each time, the district courts ruled against removal and remanded the cases to state court, concluding that the oil companies did not meet the statutory requirements. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly affirmed the remand orders, and the companies now seek review in the U.S. Supreme Court.

8–0 for Chevron USA
with the majority concurring in dissent recused filed an opinion
How the vote aligned with ideology

Unanimous.

Liberal Conservative
voted with the majority dissented

All nine justices agreed on the outcome. Concurrences may differ on reasoning, but the Court spoke with one voice on the judgment.

The opinions 2

Justice Thomas, for the Court

Clarence Thomas

Joined by Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, and Barrett.

Justice Jackson, concurring

Ketanji Brown Jackson

Joined by Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, and Barrett.

The holding

The federal officer removal statute—which allows a person acting under a federal officer to move a case from state court to federal court—requires only a close and non-tenuous connection between the challenged conduct and the defendant’s federal duties. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the majority opinion of the Court. The phrase “relating to” carries a broad ordinary meaning that encompasses any association, bearing, or concern. Under this standard, a defendant seeking removal does not need to prove that federal duties strictly caused or specifically required the challenged conduct. While the law excludes connections that are merely remote or peripheral, it covers indirect relationships where one action supports or facilitates another. Consequently, a lawsuit “relates to” a federal office when the targeted activities have a clear and significant tie to the performance of federal functions. In the context of wartime production, the extraction of raw materials—often called feedstock—is closely connected to the eventual refining of those materials for military use. Federal law does not require a government contract to explicitly direct or invite the specific method of production for those actions to relate to the federal mission. Furthermore, the “relating to” requirement remains distinct from the requirement that a defendant “acted under” a federal officer. A lawsuit may be removed even if the specific acts being challenged were not performed under direct federal command, provided they are associated with the defendant's authorized federal tasks. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, concurred in the judgment, arguing that the statute’s history still requires a “causal nexus”—a direct link where the federal duty caused the action—but agreed that the case should be moved to federal court because the oil production was a necessary step to fulfill the federal contract.

Argued by

For the petitioner
  • Paul D. Clement for the Petitioners
  • Aaron Z. Roper for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners
For the respondent
  • J. Benjamin Aguinaga for the Respondents

Case path

  1. Jun 16, 2025 granted
  2. Jan 12, 2026 argued
  3. Apr 17, 2026 decided

Read the opinions