Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment

An internet service provider does not commit "contributory copyright infringement" — meaning legal responsibility for copyright violations committed by someone else — simply by continuing to provide internet service to subscribers it knows have been flagged for piracy. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion. Copyright law recognizes two ways a company can be held responsible for infringement it did not directly commit. First, a provider is liable if it actively induced infringement — meaning it took specific steps to encourage users to pirate content, as file-sharing companies did in MGM Studios v. Grokster (2005) when they marketed their software as a piracy tool. Second, a provider is liable if its service is tailored to infringement — meaning it has no substantial legitimate use, the standard established in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios (1984), where the Court held that selling VCRs to the public was lawful because the device served many legal purposes. Knowledge alone — knowing that some users will misuse a service — has never been enough to trigger liability under either standard. Cox satisfies neither test. Nothing in the record shows Cox encouraged or promoted piracy; to the contrary, Cox sent warnings, suspended accounts, and contractually prohibited infringing use. And basic internet access plainly serves countless lawful purposes. Sony's argument that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's "safe harbor" provision — which shields ISPs from liability if they adopt policies to terminate repeat infringers — implies a baseline of liability for ISPs that ignore infringement misreads the statute. The DMCA creates a defense from liability; it does not create liability where none otherwise exists. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, concurred in the judgment, agreeing Cox lacked the required intent but arguing the majority went too far by categorically limiting secondary copyright liability to only two theories, when prior precedent (Grokster) expressly left open the possibility that other common-law theories — such as aiding and abetting — could apply, and the majority's sweeping rule renders the DMCA safe harbor meaningless going forward.