Esteras v. United States

In deciding whether to revoke a term of supervised release, a district court may not consider the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, or provide just punishment for the offense when revoking supervised release. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. When determining whether to revoke supervised release, district courts must consider eight of the ten general sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The statute specifically excludes § 3553(a)(2)(A), which covers retribution for the defendant's underlying criminal offense. This omission creates a strong negative inference under the well-established principle that expressing certain items in a list excludes others not mentioned. The statutory structure reinforces this interpretation, as neighboring provisions governing other types of sentences explicitly require courts to consider all § 3553(a) factors, while the supervised release provisions uniquely exclude retribution. This exclusion aligns with supervised release’s rehabilitative purpose in the criminal justice system. Unlike fines, probation, and imprisonment, which serve as primary punishments, supervised release provides postconfinement assistance to ease defendants' transition back into society. Courts must therefore focus on forward-looking sentencing goals—deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—rather than backward-looking retribution. District courts may consider the nature and circumstances of the original offense only as they relate to these permissible purposes, not as grounds for additional punishment based on the offense’s seriousness. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, arguing that courts should not consider retribution for any purpose in supervised release proceedings. Justice Jackson authored a concurring opinion, agreeing with the outcome but criticizing the majority’s discussion of what constitutes “offense” as unnecessary and confusing. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, arguing that the omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A) merely makes its consideration discretionary rather than forbidden and warning that the majority’s interpretation creates impractical requirements for sentencing judges.