Bouarfa v. Mayorkas

Revocation of an approved visa petition under 8 U.S.C. §1155 based on a sham-marriage determination by the Secretary of Homeland Security is the kind of discretionary decision that falls within the purview of §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain actions “in the discretion of” the agency. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The text of 8 U.S.C. §1155 grants discretion to the Secretary by using the word “may” and allowing revocation “at any time” for whatever the Secretary “deems to be good and sufficient cause.” This broad grant of authority is similar to other statutes the Court has found to commit decisions to agency discretion. The statutory context reinforces this interpretation, as neighboring provisions that are undoubtedly discretionary actually impose more constraints on the agency's discretion than §1155 does. This discretionary authority means the Secretary can choose whether to revoke an approval even after discovering it was erroneously granted, including in cases involving sham marriages. Nothing in the statute’s text or context requires automatic revocation in such situations. The fact that the agency consistently chooses to revoke approvals after finding sham marriages does not transform this discretionary power into a mandatory duty. Congress explicitly made judicial review dependent on whether legislation makes the decision discretionary, not on agency practice. While denied visa petitions based on sham marriage determinations can be reviewed in court, Congress intentionally provided different procedural protections for discretionary relief like revocations.