Medical Marijuana v. Horn
Petitioner Medical Marijuana, Inc. · Respondent Douglas J. Horn
- Reporter
- 604 U.S. ___ (2025)
- From
- United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
- How it got here
- writ of <i>certiorari</i>
Are economic harms resulting from personal injuries properly considered injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant’s acts for purposes of a civil treble-damages action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act?
Question before the CourtWhat happened
In February 2012, Douglas J. Horn was involved in a car accident that caused injuries to his hip and right shoulder. While seeking alternative natural remedies, he discovered an advertisement for Dixie X CBD Dew Drops Tincture, which claimed to contain 0% THC and be compliant with federal law. As a commercial truck driver subject to random drug testing, Horn carefully investigated these claims before purchasing and consuming the product in October 2012. However, he subsequently failed a drug test and lost his job, wages, and benefits. Independent lab tests confirmed that Dixie X contained THC, contrary to the advertisement's claims. On August 6, 2015, Horn sued the companies who allegedly falsely marketed the product—Medical Marijuana, Inc., Dixie Holdings, LLC, and Red Dice Holdings, LLC—in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York, which included a civil RICO claim and eight state law claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that Horn lacked RICO standing because he sued for the loss of earnings, which was derivative of an antecedent personal injury. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated, concluding that nothing in the text of RICO’s civil-action provision, or in its structure or history, supports a rule that bars plaintiffs from suing simply because their otherwise recoverable economic losses happen to have been connected to a non-recoverable personal injury.
The holding
Under the civil provision of RICO, 18 U. S. C. §1964(c), a plaintiff may recover for harm to business or property even if that harm resulted from a personal injury. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the opinion of the Court on behalf of the 5-4 majority. The phrase “injured in his business or property” refers to the type of harm a plaintiff can recover for, not the cause of that harm. The ordinary meaning of injury—harm or damage—applies. While the statute excludes recovery for personal injury (like pain and suffering), it does not also exclude economic consequences flowing from a personal injury. For example, if physical injury forces someone to close their business, they may still recover under RICO for the resulting business loss. The text does not support reading an "antecedent personal injury" bar into the statute. Arguments that “injury” should be interpreted narrowly to cover only tortious invasions of legal rights find no support in context, precedent, or the structure of RICO. The Court reaffirmed that the “business or property” limitation is distinct from the cause of harm and that RICO precedents use terms like injury, harm, and damage interchangeably. Other limits on RICO suits—such as the requirement of direct causation and a pattern of predicate acts—already cabin its scope. Concerns about overreach must be addressed by Congress, not the courts. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Brett Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito joined.
Argued by
- Lisa S. Blatt for the Petitioners
- Easha Anand for the Respondent
Case path
- Apr 29, 2024 granted
- Oct 15, 2024 argued
- Apr 2, 2025 decided