Smith v. Arizona

When an expert conveys an absent lab analyst’s statements in support of the expert’s opinion, and the statements provide that support only if true, then the statements come into evidence for their truth, and thus implicate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion of the Court. The Confrontation Clause applies to “testimonial hearsay,” that is, out-of-court statements introduced for their truth. The key question is whether the non-testifying analyst’s lab statements were introduced for their truth or for another purpose. The Court rejected Arizona’s argument that the statements were only used to show the basis of the non-testifying expert opinion, not for their truth.  Evidentiary rules do not control whether a statement is admitted for its truth; this is a constitutional question. When an expert conveys out-of-court statements to support their opinion, and those statements only support the opinion if true, then the statements have been offered for their truth. The jury cannot evaluate the expert’s credibility without assessing the truth of the underlying statements. In this case, the expert’s testimony relied entirely on accepting the non-testifying analyst’s statements as true. His opinions were predicated on the truth of what the analyst reported about her lab work. Allowing this practice would undermine previous decisions in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming and allow easy evasion of the Confrontation Clause. Therefore, the non-testifying analyst’s statements were introduced for their truth, violating Smith's confrontation rights if the statements were testimonial. The Court remanded for determination of whether the statements were testimonial by looking at each statement’s “primary purpose.” Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch did not join the Court’s analysis of when a statement is “testimonial,” and each wrote separately to explain how they differed. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined, arguing that the majority unnecessarily complicated the matter and should have found that the testimony sought to prove the truth of the statements and was, therefore, inadmissible hearsay subject to the Confrontation Clause.