Rudisill v. McDonough

Servicemembers who, through separate periods of service, accrue educational benefits under both the Montgomery and Post-9/11 GI Bills may use either one, in any order, up to the statutory 48-month aggregate-benefits cap. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. Section 3322(d), which discusses “coordination of entitlement,” does not apply to veterans like Rudisill because he already has two separate entitlements and is not seeking to coordinate or convert them. Further, the election mechanism in § 3327 is optional, and Rudisill does not forfeit any entitlement by declining to make this election. Finally, the consequences of making a § 3327 election, as outlined in §3327(d), only apply to individuals who actually make that election, which Rudisill did not do. Therefore, Rudisill retains his two separate entitlements, subject only to the overall 48-month cap on total benefits. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Amy Coney Barrett joined, expressing concerns about the justifications for the “veterans canon” of statutory interpretation, which favors veterans when interpreting ambiguous statutes related to veterans' benefits. Justice Kavanaugh questioned whether such a canon is consistent with the practical realities of the legislative process and the judiciary’s proper role in interpreting spending laws. He suggested that the Court may need to address the justification for this and other benefits-related canons in a future case. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined, arguing that under the plain text of the statute, Rudisill’s Post-9/11 benefits should be limited to the amount of unused Montgomery benefits he had at the time he elected to switch.