Pugin v. Garland

Virginia’s offense of accessory after the fact to a felony is an offense “relating to” obstruction of justice under the Immigration and Nationality Act’s definition of an “aggravated felony.” Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. An offense can be categorized as “relating to obstruction of justice” under §1101(a)(43)(S) without a requirement for an ongoing investigation or proceeding. This understanding is supported by dictionary definitions, federal and state laws, and the Model Penal Code. Obstruction of justice can occur even if no formal investigation or proceeding is active. The phrase “relating to” in the statute further broadens its applicability, ensuring it encompasses offenses connected to obstruction of justice, irrespective of a pending investigation. Even if certain provisions might require a pending investigation or proceeding, §1101(a)(43)(S) has a more expansive definition. Historical interpretations do not mandate a pending investigation for obstruction of justice. The rule of lenity, which favors defendants in ambiguous criminal laws, does not apply because traditional interpretation tools clearly defined the statute’s intent. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined the majority opinion in full but concurred separately to note that when Congress inserted the phrase “offense relating to obstruction of justice” into §1101(a)(43)(S), it might well have been referencing a specific and previously designated category of offenses of obstruction, many of which do not have a pending-proceeding requirement. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Neil Gorsuch and Elena Kagan joined, arguing that the Court “subverts” the commonly understood meaning of “obstruction of justice.”