Dubin v. United States

A person commits “aggravated identity theft,” if he “uses” another person’s means of identification “in relation to” a predicate offense when the use is at the crux of—rather than merely peripheral to—what makes the conduct criminal. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court. The meaning of each of the two key phrases—”uses” and “in relation to”—depends heavily on context. First, the very title of Section 1028A(a)(1), “Aggravated identity theft,” suggests that identity theft is at the core of that provision, particularly in contrast to a neighboring provision with a much broader title and scope. The language of 1028A(a)(1) further supports this reading. The provision applies when a defendant “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses” another’s identification without lawful authority. From this context, it is clear that “uses” refers to conduct akin to theft, rather than its broader meaning of “virtually any function.” Finally, the list of predicate offenses suggests that the means of identification is at the crux of the underlying criminality, not just a peripheral feature. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argues that the statute is too vague and the majority’s opinion does little to clarify its meaning.