Denezpi v. United States

The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions of distinct offenses arising from a single act, even if a single sovereign prosecutes them. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the majority opinion of the Court. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit prosecuting a person twice “for the same conduct or actions,” but for the same “offence.” Under the dual-sovereignty principle, two offenses arising from the same act can therefore be separately prosecuted without offending the Double Jeopardy Clause, even if they have identical elements and could not be separately prosecuted if enacted by a single sovereign. Denezpi’s single act constituted assault and battery under the Ute Mountain Ute Code and aggravated sexual abuse in Indian country under the U.S. Code. His prosecution for both crimes does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined in part, arguing that the same prosecuting authority charged the same defendant twice for the same crime—the very definition of double jeopardy proscribed by the U.S. Constitution.